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Designing Promise Programs:
Decisions and Effects
Shay Slifka
Abstract
Having gained popularity over the past two decades, promise programs are a relatively
new policy tool aimed at increasing the number of people who earn two-year and fouryear postsecondary educational degrees by providing partial or full financial aid. In
contrast to other forms of financial aid for postsecondary education, promise programs
guarantee funding to students of a specified geographic area, which is sometimes
accompanied by merit or need-based requirements. Promise programs differ in design,
vary in result, and potentially cause substitution and migration effects. By analyzing
several mature promise programs, I identify three fundamental design decisions that
policymakers must consider when creating promise programs.

Introduction
In January of 2015, President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden
announced America’s College Promise: a proposal offering two years of
tuition-free community college or technical college education to any student
attending at least half-time, maintaining a minimum college GPA of 2.5, and
making sufficient progress toward program completion. This proposal was
structured as a federal-state partnership in which the federal government would
match each state’s contribution by a factor of three. Thus, state governments
would pay 25% of program costs, and the federal government would pay the
other 75% (Office of the Press Secretary 2015, 1-2). America’s College Promise
has not passed through legislation despite reintroduction in 2019 (Baldwin
Senate 2019), but newly elected President Joe Biden has discussed plans to
further this educational initiative that he initially proposed as Vice President
alongside President Obama (Biden-Harris 2020).
Modeled after the state-level Tennessee Promise, America’s College Promise
would be the broadest program to date as the first federal-level promise
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program. Research on the Tennessee Promise and other early promise
programs, however, has identified significant variance in program designs,
results, and potential unintended effects. Given this variability, policymakers
concerned with efficient spending must make informed decisions about promise
program design variables and their effects before large-scale implementation
takes place. This paper will focus on three fundamental policy decisions: firstdollar vs. last-dollar, two-year vs. four-year programs, and what is the goal?
Terms and Definitions
Promise programs are financial aid programs that promise funding for the
purpose of earning a post-secondary education to students of a specified
geographic area. Defining these programs are three general goals: to increase
awareness and preparedness of post-secondary education opportunities,
increase access to those opportunities through partial or full financial aid, and
stimulate economic and community growth (Swanson and Ritter 2018, 4-5).
Beyond these broad defining characteristics and goals, promise programs vary
significantly in design.
All promise programs are place-based, meaning that eligibility for the program
requires residence and high school graduation within a designated geographic
area. The breadth of place requirements, however, varies on a spectrum from
broad to narrow programs. Broad programs limit eligibility to students at the
state level, narrow programs limit eligibility to students at a high school
institutional level, and programs within the spectrum may limit eligibility at
district and county levels. Programs also vary in duration of
residency/attendance requirements. Some programs have no duration of
residency/attendance requirements, but others may require attendance within
the designated place from years 9-12 or years K-12, with only partial
scholarships provided to students attending years 9-12 (Swanson and Ritter
2018, 15).
Financial award structure can take the form of either first-dollar or last-dollar.
First-dollar programs provide a fixed amount of aid to students without regard
to other sources of financial aid. In these programs, students are allowed to use
any financial aid in excess of the amount of tuition and mandatory fees toward
textbooks and living expenses. By contrast, last-dollar programs provide aid in
the remaining amount of tuition and mandatory fees after other sources of
financial aid have been applied. In addition, last-dollar aid covers only tuition
and mandatory fees, with no aid provided for textbooks and living expenses
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(Swanson and Ritter 2018, 5). Often the choice of financial award structure is
related to the program’s source and size of funding. Most first-dollar programs
are funded by private endowments, whereas last-dollar programs may be
funded by either private or public sources.
In terms of eligibility, programs are either universal or restrictive. Universal
promise programs include any student within the promise place requirement
without regard to other demographic or student performance factors. Restrictive
promise programs may include need-based requirements, such as having family
income below a certain threshold. Other restrictive programs may include merit
requirements such as a minimum GPA, school attendance requirements, college
preparatory courses, completing community service projects, or mentorship
from a community member (Carruthers et al., 6-7).
Many city and county level promise programs emphasize a community
orientation, which can influence restrictions on how and where financial aid
from the promise program can be used. Promise programs may provide aid for
up to two years and often require that the institution be an accredited community
or technical college, while others cover four years at universities. Many other
postsecondary institutional restrictions may apply such as state restrictions,
public versus private, and even use of the award being restricted to a single
institution within the promise area. Any of the aforementioned variables may
combine to form a unique program whose place requirement, financial aid
structure, funding, eligibility requirements, and institutional restrictions are
determined by the city, county, or state based on the availability of funds and
the needs of that geographic area.
Policy Decision I: First-Dollar vs. Last-Dollar
This paper will analyze the outcomes of four mature promise programs: two
first-dollar and two last-dollar. Frequently cited as the maiden program, the
Kalamazoo Promise was established in 2005 for graduates of Kalamazoo public
schools in Kalamazoo, Michigan. As a first-dollar, universal program that
covers up to four years of aid at any college or university in Michigan, the
Kalamazoo Promise is a generous, privately funded program that has served as
a model for many promise programs to follow, such as the El Dorado Promise
(Bartik et al. 2016). The El Dorado Promise was established in 2006 for
graduates of schools in the El Dorado, Arkansas school district as a first-dollar,
universal, generous, and privately funded program covering up to five years of
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aid at any postsecondary institution in the country (Swanson and Ritter 2018,
3-4).
In 2008, Knox Achieves was established for graduates of schools in Knox
County, Tennessee as a last-dollar, universal, privately funded program that
covered up to two years of aid at community colleges. After three years, Knox
Achieves was replaced by a broader county-level program called tnAchieves,
which served as a model for the statewide program, Tennessee Promise, that
was introduced in 2014. Aside from broadening the place requirements and
finding a new source of funding, tnAchieves and the Tennessee Promise have
similar designs as the original Knox Achieves program (Carruthers et al., 3-7).
In the same year as the establishment of Knox Achieves, the Pittsburgh Promise
was established as a last-dollar program for students of Pittsburgh public
schools. Though the Pittsburgh Promise is a last-dollar program, it generously
covers up to four years at any post-secondary institution in Pennsylvania.
Furthermore, students may be eligible for a promise award of up to $1,000 per
year even if their cost of attendance, which includes tuition, mandatory fees,
books, and living expenses, are completely covered by other sources of funding.
The generosity of this program, however, has been scaled back in recent years
as local fundraising for such a costly program has proved to be unsustainable.
The Pittsburgh Promise is unique in being a generous, last-dollar program, and
it is the only program in this analysis that is not universal because of its
minimum GPA and attendance requirements (Page et al. 2019, 2-7).
Because first-dollar programs can provide fundamental assistance in direct
costs of tuition and mandatory fees, as well as supplemental assistance in
reducing opportunity costs and other indirect costs of attending college, they
are considered more generous. As a consequence, however, they are also more
costly. By contrast, last-dollar programs provide only unmet fundamental
assistance in direct costs of tuition and mandatory fees. Though they are less
generous, last-dollar programs share the cost of post-secondary financial aid
with private programs and government programs, such as Federal Student Aid,
which administers FAFSA and Pell Grants (Carruthers et al., 8). With greater
generosity driving higher program costs, the natural questions emerge whether
greater generosity from first-dollar promise programs leads to better outcomes
and whether those outcomes are worth higher program costs.
In terms of college enrollment, both first-dollar and last-dollar promise
programs have had positive impacts. The generous, first-dollar, four-year El
Dorado Promise increased postsecondary enrollment by 11.4 percentage points
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(Swanson and Ritter 2018, 34). The last-dollar, four-year program, Pittsburgh
Promise, had an increase of 7 percentage points in postsecondary enrollment
(Page et al. 2019, 21). Alternatively, the other last-dollar program that is less
generous and covers only two years, Knox Achieves, had only a 3 percentage
point increase in postsecondary enrollment (Carruthers and Fox 2015, Table 2).
This research indicates that promise programs, regardless of financial award
structure, increase postsecondary enrollment; however, more generous
programs, which are typically first-dollar, do so at a rate roughly two to four
times that of less generous programs, which are typically last-dollar. In the lastdollar, yet generous Pittsburgh Promise, the program increased postsecondary
enrollment by more than its less generous, last-dollar counterpart but by less
than the first-dollar program.
Analyzing program results across gender and racial subgroups suggests that
promise programs have the greatest positive effects on conventionally
disadvantaged students: women and students of color. The first-dollar
Kalamazoo Promise increased program completion by 45-49% for women but
had a null effect on men, and it increased program completion by 50% for
students of color but had a null effect on white students (Bartik et al. 2016).
Similarly, the first-dollar El Dorado Promise increased postsecondary
enrollment by 4.6 percentage points more for women than men and increased
postsecondary enrollment by 13.4 percentage points for students of color while
having an insignificant effect on white students (Swanson and Ritter 2018,
Table 7). Thus, both first-dollar programs were associated with pronounced
positive effects for women and students of color.
Last-dollar Knox Achieves, however, had no significant difference in effects
among women and men in terms of credit accumulation, degree attainment, and
earnings after high school, but it did have greater effects on black and Hispanic
students compared to white students (Carruthers et al. Table 6). Similarly, the
last-dollar Pittsburgh Promise had no significant differences across gender and
racial subgroups. An important note, however, is that the Pittsburgh Promise is
the only promise program in this analysis to be restrictive with GPA and high
school attendance requirements. On average, black students in Pittsburgh public
schools have lower average GPAs, such as the graduating class of 2007 at 2.27
for black students compared to white students at 2.98 (Page et al. 2019, 22).
Thus, GPA requirements that restrict a greater portion of conventionally
disadvantaged students from receiving promise funds may decrease the
magnitude of positive effects on those subgroups that would otherwise be
received in a universal program. Overall, these results suggest that promise
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programs, regardless of financial award structure, have the greatest positive
effects on conventionally disadvantaged groups, but more generous (typically
first-dollar) programs have effects that are more pronounced for women and
students of color compared to less generous (typically last-dollar) programs. In
addition, GPA requirements may further mitigate the magnitude of positive
program effects on conventionally disadvantaged populations.
Analysis across income subgroups suggests heterogeneous results between
first-dollar and last-dollar programs. The first-dollar Kalamazoo Promise was
associated with a 12 percentage point increase in attainment of any credential,
and program completion results varied by only 3 percentage points across
income subgroups (Bartik et al. 2016). Since first-dollar programs provide a
fixed amount of aid to students of all income levels, they appear to have similar
effects on students across income subgroups. Alternatively, Carruthers et al.
(22) found in last-dollar Knox Achieves that middle-income students had the
highest increase in accumulated credits of 22% compared to their low- and
high-income counterparts at 15% and 8%, respectively. They also found the
only income group to experience an increase in likelihood of attaining a
bachelor’s degree was the middle-income group at 1.8 percentage points
(Carruthers et al., 22). A potential explanation for this program’s greater effect
on middle-income students is that this subgroup is least likely to receive
financial aid from other sources; high-income students may have familial
financial aid assistance, and low-income students are more likely to receive
funding through programs like the Pell Grant. Thus, last-dollar programs like
Knox Achieves provide a higher amount of aid that would otherwise be
unavailable to middle-income students and, consequently, last-dollar programs
have a greater positive effect on middle-income students.
Thus far, this analysis has determined that first-dollar and last-dollar programs
are both associated with positive effects on postsecondary educational
attainment with pronounced effects on conventionally disadvantaged groups.
Results have differed, however, in magnitude between first-dollar and lastdollar programs with the former having greater effects, which suggests that
greater generosity from first-dollar programs does lead to better outcomes. The
question still remains, however, whether those better outcomes are worth the
higher program costs. Compared to last-dollar Knox Achieves, which spent
approximately $1,000 per enrolled student per year, first-dollar programs such
as the Kalamazoo and El Dorado promises averaged costs that were eight to ten
times as high (Carruthers et al., 8). Despite significantly higher costs, research
indicates that first-dollar programs have significant positive returns. In a cost-
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benefit analysis of the Kalamazoo Promise, in which expected lifetime earnings
were used to calculate benefits, Bartik et al. (2016) found significant positive
returns and varying results for gender and race subgroups.
In the aggregate, the Kalamazoo Promise had a benefit-cost ratio of 4.66, 11.3%
rate of return, and benefits exceeding costs by $64,463. Women had a higher
outcome than the aggregate with a benefit-cost ratio of 4.75, 12.2% rate of
return, and benefits exceeding cost by $69,008. For men, however, the study
showed no increase in educational attainment, which led to no increase in
earnings. The high number of men attending college represented a high cost
resulting in no positive benefits in terms of expected earnings. Students of color
had a benefit-cost ratio of 5.37, 12.4% rate of return, and benefits exceeding
cost by $51,925. By comparison, there were small effects for white students
with a benefit-cost ratio of 0.75, 1.9% rate of return, and costs actually
exceeding benefits by $5,679 (Bartik et al. 2016, Table 5). Though men and
whites have high returns on education, many of the male and white students
participating in the Kalamazoo Promise would have completed a bachelor’s
degree without the presence of the program. Thus, for men and white students,
the program provides a very small increase in educational attainment compared
to the high cost of attendance the program pays for. With that said, a generous,
first-dollar, universal program like the Kalamazoo Promise may help men and
white students to reduce college loans, but it does not have the same increase in
educational attainment for them as it does for women and students of color.
Discussion of the policy implications these heterogeneous results may have will
occur later under Policy Decision III. Overall, first-dollar programs, though
more costly, have significant positive returns in the aggregate with varying
results across gender and racial subgroups.
Cost-benefit comparisons to last-dollar programs are not yet available, though
Carruthers et al. attempted a back-of-the-envelope calculation that led to an
inconclusive result. In that study, Carruthers et al. examine the effects of Knox
Achieves on early labor market returns, and they find positive returns for both
students who were eligible and students who participated in Knox Achieves.
Earnings began to rise for eligible students five years after high school
graduation, with a peak rise in the seventh year of $732.70 and tapering effects
over the eighth and ninth years. Participants in Knox Achieves experienced a
similar pattern of rise in earnings, however, their peak rise over doubled that of
eligible students (Carruthers et al., 19). Carruthers et al. (20) also looked at the
impact of Knox Achieves on Unemployment Insurance (UI) covered jobs in
Tennessee, which showed a higher likelihood of Knox Achieves students
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working in UI-covered jobs one to nine years after high school graduation,
higher log earnings in those jobs years one to eight, and a two percentage point
decrease in attrition from UI covered jobs. Though these early labor market
returns are positive, the back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis attempted
by Carruthers et al. was inconclusive due to the presence of a potential
substitution effect away from bachelor’s degrees, which typically result in
higher labor market earnings. This potential substitution effect is the cause for
Policy Decision II.
Policy Decision II: Two-Year vs. Four-Year
Research suggests that both two-year and four-year programs may influence
students to substitute away from certain types of postsecondary education that
they may have pursued in the absence of a promise program. Knox Achieves, a
last-dollar, two-year program, increased the likelihood of students earning a
certificate or associate’s degree by one to three percentage points, but it did not
increase the average likelihood of students earning a bachelor’s degree. Certain
subgroups, such as low-income, low-achieving, black, and Hispanic students,
were more likely to complete a bachelor’s degree, but an imprecise measure
indicated that other, more advantaged subgroups were actually less likely to
complete a bachelor’s degree (Carruthers et al., 32). Of Knox County students
who did not participate in the program, 25% had earned a bachelor’s degree
within six years of graduation, whereas only 17% of Knox Achieves
participants earned that level of credential within six years of graduation.
Though the coefficient estimate was imprecise, eligibility for Knox Achieves
was associated with either a rise in bachelor’s degree attainment of up to two
percent or a fall of up to seven percent (Carruthers et al., 18).
These results suggest that two-year programs, like Knox Achieves, may
influence students on average away from bachelor’s degrees. A potential
explanation for this effect is that the transfer process from community college
to a four-year institution can be confusing, complicated, and costly, which may
deter students. As previously suggested, this effect may have an impact on the
cost-benefit analyses of two-year programs because bachelor’s degrees
typically result in higher earnings premiums than associate’s degrees.
Therefore, the benefit of increased earnings from additional college educated
workers may not outweigh the cost of fewer bachelor’s degree earning workers
(Carruthers et al., 32).
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By contrast, the El Dorado Promise, a first-dollar, four-year program increased
attainment of bachelor’s degrees within six years of graduation by 10.7
percentage points, but it did not increase attainment of associate’s degrees on
average. Within the subgroup of students with above average GPAs, however,
students ineligible for the El Dorado Promise had a rate of increase of
associate’s degree attainment that was 3.7 percentage points higher than eligible
students (Swanson and Ritter 2018, 21-34). These results suggest that four-year
programs, such as the El Dorado Promise, may influence students away from
associate’s degrees and towards bachelor’s degrees with higher earnings
premiums. Intuitively, if students are offered the opportunity to receive greater
benefits without the constraint of internalizing the higher costs of those benefits,
a rational student will seek to maximize their benefits holding all else equal.
Both potential substitution effects require further research to ensure that
promise programs are designed to efficiently increase postsecondary
educational attainment. If students are influenced in their decision of
postsecondary education by factors other than their skills and abilities, then
there is a potential for inefficiency from job-skills mismatching. If two-year
programs influence students away from bachelor’s degrees, then students with
skills and abilities consistent with bachelor’s degrees may receive jobs that do
not maximize their potential contributions to society through higher skilled
labor and higher earnings premiums.
Conversely, if four-year programs influence students away from associate’s
degrees, then students with skills and abilities consistent with associate’s
degrees will impose higher costs on society than what is necessary for their
contributions. Thus, while promise programs aim to reduce inefficiencies in
postsecondary educational attainment caused by informational and financial
barriers, they may also cause inefficiencies by influencing decisions
inconsistent with job-skills matching. Further research needs to be conducted
to confirm the existence of these effects and determine their magnitudes so that
policymakers can choose between the respective consequences of each
program’s substitution effects, or policymakers can potentially alter program
designs to mitigate those effects.
Policy Decision III: What is the Goal?
Factoring into the choices made for Policy Decisions I and II are tradeoffs
between program goals. One tradeoff in goals exists between increasing the
portion of the population with a postsecondary education versus increasing the
amount of postsecondary education provided to each participant. For example,
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Pittsburgh’s population, academic enrollment, and academic achievement have
been in decline since the late 1950’s. In 1968, enrollment in Pittsburgh public
schools was 68,000 students, and today enrollment has decreased to under
25,000 students (Page et al. 2019, 5). Furthermore, 68% of Pennsylvania
students score proficient or advanced in mathematics and 72% in reading,
meanwhile only 48% of students in Pittsburgh public schools scored proficient
or advanced in mathematics and 63% in reading (Page et al. 2019, 5). Given
these city-specific issues, the Pittsburgh Promise aimed to increase population,
enrollment, and quality of education. With those goals in mind, the Pittsburgh
Promise developed as a first-dollar, four-year program that applied to a narrow
portion of the population, and it could, consequently, provide more education
per participant.
The Tennessee Promise was implemented as part of the state’s “Drive to 55”
campaign, which aimed to increase the percentage of the population with a
postsecondary education from 39.3% to 55% by 2025 (Carruthers et al., 3). The
emphasis of this goal is not on increasing the amount of education per
participant, like the Pittsburgh Promise. Rather, the emphasis of this statespecific goal is to increase the portion of the population with a postsecondary
education. With that goal in mind, the Tennessee Promise developed as a lastdollar, two-year program that applied to a broad portion of the population and,
consequently, provided less education per participant. Thus, funding limitations
create a tradeoff between the portion of the population and the amount of
education per person that a promise program can provide. Choosing between
these tradeoffs will help policymakers to determine the first two policy choices
between first-dollar vs. last-dollar and two-year vs. four-year programs.
Another tradeoff in goals exists between increasing postsecondary educational
attainment vs. decreasing student loan debt. Previous sections have established
that first-dollar programs have better outcomes with higher costs, and promise
programs, regardless of financial award structure, have the greatest positive
effects on conventionally disadvantaged populations. Furthermore, the
Kalamazoo Promise had null effects on men and white students in terms of
postsecondary educational attainment. With those results in mind, if the goal of
a promise program is to increase postsecondary educational attainment, then
policymakers might decide to provide more education per participant through
first-dollar programs (with better results) to a restricted narrow population of
conventionally disadvantaged students like women and students of color (who
receive the greatest benefits). In theory, such a program would be efficient for
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the goal of increasing postsecondary educational attainment, though it would
arguably lack equity.
Alternatively, if the goal of a promise program is to decrease student loan debt,
then policymakers might decide to provide less education per participant
through last-dollar programs to a universal broad population who would all
benefit from reduced student loan debt. Thus, choosing between these tradeoffs
will also help policymakers to decide between first-dollar vs. last-dollar and
two-year versus four-year programs.
Other Considerations
In addition to tradeoffs in program goals, policymakers must factor several
other considerations into Policy Decisions I and II such as differences in racial
composition, differences in beliefs about education, potential migration effects,
and funding constraints. For example, the racial composition of Pittsburgh
public school systems is 53% black, which is over double the amount of black
Pittsburgh residents (Page et al. 2019, 5). Given the significantly greater impact
that promise programs have on black students and other disadvantaged
populations, the Pittsburgh Promise would reasonably be designed differently
than a program with a significantly higher population of white students.
Regions also differ in their beliefs about education. Perna and Leigh’s (2017,
3) sociological framework for studying promise programs assumes that
students’ understanding of the value of postsecondary education and the
postsecondary institutions they consider are a result of their “habitus.” “Habitus
refers to the internalized system of thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions that is
acquired from the immediate environment, including the social, organizational,
and cultural contexts in which individuals are embedded” (Perna and Leigh
2017, 3). Therefore, if student beliefs and choices vary by region, then promise
programs would reasonably be designed differently by region to capture this
variance.
Migration between regions may also influence program design. College
graduates are more likely to leave their hometown area to pursue national job
opportunities compared to non-college graduates; 20 percentage points fewer
college graduates stay in their hometown area compared to non-college
graduates (Bartik et al. 2016). As a result, promise programs might contribute
to a reduction in community population size. College graduates who attend
college in their home state, however, are 10 percentage points more likely to
remain in their home state after graduation (Bartik et al. 2016). Thus, promise
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programs that promote in-state colleges may induce graduates to stay in the
local workforce, which would result in a more highly educated workforce.
Fostering a higher skilled workforce may have a spillover effect of attracting
more skilled labor to the area. Parents may also be more likely to stay in or
move to a promise area as a result of the attractive financial aid offer. The
Kalamazoo Promise shows evidence of this effect by increasing district public
high school enrollment by 30% (Bartik et al. 2016).
When taking into consideration differences in racial composition, differences
in beliefs about education, and potential migration effects, a national program
is not likely to capture the vast heterogeneity of the United States. The positive
effects of city-, county-, and state-level programs thus far, however, provide
hope for efficiently designed smaller, specialized programs. Therefore,
policymakers must also decide on the size or scope of each program. Though
city or county level programs would ideally capture the most demographic
differences, higher administrative costs and city/county competition may
inhibit such micro-level management. By comparison, designing 50 unique
state-level programs would contain costs and migration effects while still
capturing variance by geographics. Before a federal mandate of state level
programs can be implemented, however, more research needs to be done on the
potential substitution effects of both two-year and four-year programs. In
addition, significant research would need to be done on state-level racial
compositions, habitus, and problems to overcome to ensure that program
designs align with each state’s goals and demographics.
A potential problem for mandating any level of program, however, would be
determining a source of funding. Most city and county level programs have
been established and administered as a result of private donations. For example,
the first-dollar, four-year El Dorado Promise was established by an initial
endowment of $50 million from the Fortune 500 company, Murphy Oil
(Swanson and Ritter 2018, 3). Most state-level promise programs instead rely
on public sources of funding, such as the last-dollar, two-year Tennessee
Promise, which is funded by an endowment of $361.1 million from excess
lottery reserve funds (Meehan et al. 2019, 4).
These examples demonstrate the tradeoffs made between narrow population,
generous programs and broad population, less generous programs; as promise
programs cover a broader population of students, more funding is required and
less generosity is available. Because private donations are not likely to cover
the cost incurred by broad population promise programs, policymakers would
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need to determine how widespread mandated promise programs could feasibly
be publicly funded.
Would public funding be enough to provide four-year promise programs? If
not, would two-year programs cause a substitution effect away from bachelor’s
degrees? Although mandating state-level programs, as opposed to city and
county level programs, would likely reduce migration effects, would the effects
still be significant enough to cause labor market distortions by state?
If a national mandate of state-level programs was funded by a federal-state
partnership in which the federal government matches $3 for every $1 spent by
state governments, as suggested by President Biden, will wealthier states offer
superior education through higher funding and leave less wealthy states with
inferior education leading to deeper inequality? Though promise programs have
had positive effects thus far, these questions demonstrate that many policy
decisions and potential effects need to be considered before policymakers
implement widespread promise programs.

Limitations
Several limitations to this research apply. First, the rapid proliferation of
promise programs in recent years means that many programs are still too young
to have substantial data for program completion and labor market returns.
Second, the unique design of each promise program makes it difficult to
aggregate program results based on one variable. The sample of promise
programs analyzed in this paper was selected due to program maturity and
financial award structure. These four programs represent only a few variations
of promise programs. Perna and Leigh (2017, 3) found 289 programs, as of
2017, in the United States that fit their broad promise program criteria. Due to
the high variance in program designs, categorizing promise programs by one
variable can fail to capture the unique influence of each design variable. For
example, the Pittsburgh Promise is a last-dollar program, but its first-dollar-like
generosity led to increased postsecondary enrollment at a rate closer to firstdollar programs as opposed to its last-dollar counterpart.
Third, some county- and city-level programs have small sample sizes that may
bias results especially when researching variance across subgroups. Finally, the
cost benefit analysis discussed in this paper measured benefits in terms of
expected lifetime earnings. Such a narrow analysis might fail to capture non-
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pecuniary benefits such as improved physical and mental health, reduced crime,
increased civic engagement, and other positive externalities. It also does not
take into account that higher gross income from more college graduates will
result in higher tax revenues and reduced transfers (Bartik et al. 2016).
Conclusion
Research on promise programs at the city, county, and state levels has shown
positive effects on postsecondary enrollment, attainment, and labor market
returns in the aggregate. In addition, programs typically have greater positive
effects for traditionally disadvantaged populations. The magnitude of these
positive effects, however, are greater for generous (typically first-dollar)
programs compared to less generous (typically last-dollar) programs. Though
first-dollar programs have greater positive effects, they are also significantly
more costly than last-dollar programs. The decision to design a promise
program as first-dollar or last-dollar may be influenced by the size and source
of funding and the goals of the promise area. These factors may also influence
the decision to design a promise program as two-year versus four-year. That
decision, however, may cause substitution effects, which merits further
research. In addition to funding and goals, policymakers must also consider
racial composition, beliefs about education, and potential migration effects
when designing promise programs.
Because White House leaders have already proposed the implementation of a
federal-level promise program, studying the effects of design variables and
further researching potential effects is essential to designing a program that
maximizes efficiency. Through their many design variables, promise programs
have the ability to capture much of the vast heterogeneity of the United States
in terms of racial composition, beliefs about education, and goals. In order for
that heterogeneity to be captured, however, policymakers must be informed
about the tradeoffs and effects of their policy design decisions.
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